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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
#2B-12/21/76 
In the Matter of 
VILLAGE OF WAYLAND, 
Respondent, 
-and-
WAYLAND POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party. 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The charge herein was filed by the Wayland Police Benevolent Association 
(Association) on February 9, 1976. It alleges that the Village of Wayland 
1] 
(Village) violated CSL §§209-a.l(a), (b), (c) and (d) in that it abolished the 
positions of its only three patrolmen because of the formation of the .. 
Association. In its answer, the Village denied that the jobs were eliminated 
because of the formation of the Association and alleged that its action was 
prompted by financial considerations. 
After a hearing, lasting two days, the hearing officer found that the 
Village had abolished the positions of its three patrolmen in order to avoid 
having to negotiate with the recently formed Association. He concluded that 
v 
1] These sections make it improper practices for an employer "(a) to.inter-
fere with, restrain or coerce public employees in the exercise of their rights 
guaranteed in section two hundred two for the purpose of depriving them of such 
rights; (b) to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of 
any employee organization for the purpose of depriving them of such rights; 
(c) to discriminate against any employee for the purpose of encouraging or 
discouraging membership in, or participation in the activities of, any employee 
organization; or (d) to refuse to negotiate in good faith with the duly recog-
nized or certified representatives of its public employees." 
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th is conduct violated CSL §§209-a.l (a) and (c ) , but tha t i t did not v io la te 
2] 
CSL§§209-a.l(b) and (d). 
As a remedy for the violation of CSL §§209-a.1(a) and (c), the hearing 
officer recommended that the Village be ordered to offer reinstatement to the 
three discharged police officers and to compensate them for wages and benefits 
lost as a result of the violation with three percent interest. He also 
recommended that the Village be ordered to cease and desist from engaging in 
further discriminatory acts against them and to post an appropriate notice to 
be supplied by this Board. 
The Village has filed exceptions.to the hearing officer's determination. 
The exceptions and supporting memoranda argueuthat: 
1. the evidence does not support the findings of fact that its action 
was motivated by animus against the Association or by anything else but 
financial considerations. 
2. the Village Law precludes this Board from ordering a Village to 
reestablish abolished positions as does the Taylor Law, because the abolition 
of a position is a management prerogative and, 
3. because one of the positions was filled by a police officer employe 1 
pursuant to the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CTEA) with federal 
funds, the hearing officer could not order his reinstatement. 
2] His reasoning with respect to the alleged violation of CSL §209-a.l(d) 
was that although the Association had requested negotiations on November 3, 1975, 
simultaneously with its request for recognition, it had not renewed the request 
for negotiations after December 8, 1975, on which date it was granted recog-
nition. According to the hearing officer, the request for negotiations, 
having been made before the grant of recognition, was of no legal consequence 
even after the Association was recognized and because an employer is under no 
obligation to negotiate until it has been requested to do so, he dismissed the 
allegation of a "(d)" violation. 
' 4500 — ^ 
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The Association did not file any exceptions to the hearing officer's 
dismissal of the alleged violations of CSL §§209-a.l(b) and (d). It responded 
to the Village's exceptions by urging that the Decision and Recommended Order 
of the hearing officer be made final. 
Having reviewed the record, we determine that the hearing officer's 
analysis of the evidence is sound and we confirm his findings of fact. We also 
"confirnPthose"~6~f Tiis—concTusxons—6~f"law tTiatTTecT to ~tlae~determin^txloir"" thatTTiher~~ 
31 Village had violated CSL §§209-a.l(a) and (c). 
The analysis contained in his opinion is sufficient to answer all of the 
Village's exceptions except the one relating to the employee whose position 
had been financed by CETA funds. On that, we have already indicated that 
persons working for a public employer covered by the Taylor Law are employees 
of that covered public employer and are entitled to the protections of the 
Taylor Law even though their salary and benefits are financed by federal 
funds. (Matter of Amityville Public Schools, 5 PERB 113043 [1972]). 
ACCORDINGLY, we confirm the determination of the hearing officer and 
WE ORDER that: 
1. The Village forthwith offer reinstatement to Ruscitto, Muhleisen 
and Zigenfus; 
2. The Village forthwith ciompjensafce Fuse it to, Muhleisen and Zigenfus 
for any wages and benefits lost as a result of the violation found herein, 
plus interest at the rate of three percent minus the amount of wages actually 
earned by each from the time of his termination until his reinstatement. 
3] We do not confirm the reasoning of the hearing officer that a request for 
negotiations, made in.advance of recognition -and simultaneously with .a. request 
for recognition, is a nullity and without legal consequence as. an appropriate 
request after recognition has been granted. However, inasmuch as the Associa-
tion has not directed any exceptions to this conclusion, we treat the 
allegation of a "•.(d)" violation as having been withdrawn and do not make any 
determination on it. (See §204.14 of our Rules) A'^O'I 
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3. The Village cease and desist from engaging in similar coercive and 
discriminatory acts toward Ruscitto, Muhleisen and Zigenfus because of their 
exercise of rights protected by the Act; and 
4. The Village conspicuously post appropriate notices to be supplied by 
this Board at locations ordinarily used for written communications to employees 
in the Police Department. 
Dated at Albany, New York 
This 21st day of December, 1976 
ROBERT D. HELSBY, /Chairman 
g^&L /Ckr,.. 
IDA KLAUS, Member 
Board - U-2006 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEE: 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
:
 ancTiri onier~to~effecttiate~thei policiesof the ~ : -— 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify our employees that: 
WE WILL forthwith offer reinstatement to Patrolmen Ruscitto, 
Muhleisen and Zigenfus and compensate each of them for any 
wages and benefits lost as a result of the elimination of their 
positions,plus interest at the rate of three percent minus the 
amount of wages actually earned by each from the time of his 
termination until his reinstatement. 
WE WILL neither discriminate nor interfere with, restrain or 
coerce employees as a result of their exercise of rights 
protected by CSL §202. . 
. • ; 
- Employer 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
This Notice .must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. •dl'SOti' 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CORNING POLICE DEPARTMENT, 
STEUBEN COUNTY CHAPTER CSEA, 
Respondent, 
CITY OF CORNING, 
-and-
Charging Party. 
#20-12/21/76 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. U-2295 
The charge herein was filed by"the City" of"Corning (City) on 
September 20, 1976. As amended, it alleges that the Corning Police Department, 
Steuben County Chapter CSEA (respondent) violated CSL §209-a.2(b) in that it 
improperly insisted upon the negotiation of four demands that are not 
mandatory subjects of negotiation by requesting an arbitrator to issue an 
award granting those demands. Respondent's answer asserts that the demands in 
question are mandatory subjects of negotiation. As this matter involves a 
disagreement as to scope of negotiations, it was accorded expedited treatment 
under §204.4 of our Rules and is before us on the stipulation and briefs of the 
parties, without a report or recommendation from a hearing officer. 
The demands in question are: 
1) "The officer will receive payment at time and one-
half his regular hourly rate for hours worked due 
to a shift change for which he did not receive 
written notification at least forty-eight (48) 
hours prior to such change, said notification 
to contain the reason for such change." 
2) "There will be no shift change in a three (3) month 
period, except in a police emergency, which does not 
include a shortage of manpower." 
3) "There shall be only one (1) work schedule for 
each three (3) - month period which is to be 
posted in three (3) places." 
4) "There will be a rotation of days off." 
ld0^3 
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We determine that the first demand is a mandatory subject of negotiation. It 
is essentially a demand for reasonable notification of a shift change and for 
a premium wage rate to compensate employees for the inconvenience caused them 
when such notification is not given. Reasonable advance notice is a proper 
demand for fair treatment. Premium wage rates for the purpose here involved 
are not unusual. Such premiums are found in the minimum wage orders promulgated 
by the New York State Department of Labor. For example: the Minimum Wage 
Order for the Laundry-Cleaning and Dying Industry establishes a premium rate 
for employees who are inconvenienced by having to work a split shift 
(12 NYCRR §135-1.7) and the Minimum Wage Order for the Restaurant Industry 
requires premium rates for employees who are inconvenienced by having to 
report for duty on a day when not assigned to actual work (12 NYCRR §137-1.6) 
or by work spread out over an excessive number of hours (12 NYCRR §137-1.7). 
The other three demands in question are all covered by our determination 
in Matter of City of White Plains, 5 PERB, 1(3088 (1972). In that Decision, we 
said (at p. 3015): 
"It is the City alone which must determine the number of 
firemen it must have on duty at any given time. It cannot 
be compelled to negotiate with respect to this matter. 
However, there are many ways in which the schedules of 
individuals and groups of firemen may be manipulated in 
order to satisfy the City's requirement for fire protection. 
It is this manipulation of the schedules of individuals and 
groups of firemen which is involved in the Fire Fighters' 
demand. Within the framework which the City may impose 
unilaterally that a specified number of Fire Fighters must 
be on duty at specified times, the City is obligated to 
negotiate over the tours of duty of the Fire Fighters 
within its employ." 
Applying that analysis, we determine that the second and third demands 
are not mandatory subjects of negotiation and that the fourth is. Both the 
second and third demands would compromise the fight of the City to determine th* 
number of police it should have on duty at any given time. 
Except in a police emergency, the City would not be permitted to change 
the schedule of policemen so as to alter the number of men who would be on duty 
4505 
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at any time or to replace absent policemen in order to maintain the desired 
complement. 
The fourth demand does not interfere with the City's prerogative of 
determining the number of policemen it should have on duty at a given time. 
Rather, it is directed to the manipulation of the schedules of individuals 
and groups of policemen, which can be accomplished in a manner that respects 
the right of the City to determine its manpower needs. 
NOW, THEREFORE, in view of the above conclusions of law, with respect 
to those matters therein that we determine to be mandatory subjects of 
negotiation, we find that respondent did not insist upon negotiations 
improperly because there is a duty to negotiate over them, and we dismiss 
the charge. With respect to those matters that we determine not to be 
mandatory subjects of negotiation, we find that respondent did insist upon 
negotiations improperly and 
WE ORDER respondent to negotiate in good faith with the City of 
„ • . 1 
Corning .— 
Dated at Albany, New York 
This 21st day of December, 1976 
ROBERT D. HELSBY,/Chairman 
^OSEip R. CROWLEY, Member 
IDA KLAUS, Member 
1_ Respondent's duty to negotiate in good faith over such non-mandatory 
subj ects of negotiation contemplates their withdrawing such demands from 
arbitration. 
4o*)b 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
AUBURN CITY UNIT, CAYUGA COUNTY CHAPTER, 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Charging Party, 
-and- .... _-... 
THE CITY OF AUBURN, 
Respondent. 
On June 28, 1976, the Auburn City Unit of the Cayuga County Chapter of 
CSEA (charging party) filed a charge under CSL §209-a.l(d) alleging that the 
City of Auburn (respondent) had refused to negotiate in good faith in that it 
unilaterally promulgated a residency requirement covering employees in a unit 
represented by the charging party. The respondent acknowledged that it had 
promulgated a residency requirement as alleged in the charge, but defended its 
actions on the ground that the residency requirement was not a mandatory subject 
of negotiation so that its conduct was not violative of the Taylor Law. As the 
dispute involves a disagreement as to the scope of negotiations under the 
Taylor Law, the matter has been transferred to this Board pursuant to §204.4 of 
our Rules. 
After receiving a letter brief from the charging party and hearing 
oral argument by the respondent, we sought additional comment on the legal 
issue involved in the case. Memoranda of law and oral argument were solicited 
and received from various public employer associations and employee organiza-
tions . 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. U-2175 
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FACTS 
During negotiations between the charging party and the respondent for 
an agreement to become effective on July 1, 1976, a proposal was submitted by 
the respondent on March 20, 1976 that would have required not only new employees 
but also existing employees who resided within the city on the effective date 
1. 
of the agreement to continue to reside within the city. It was rejected 'by ' 
the charging party. Thereafter, on June 3, 1976, the Auburn City Council 
enacted an ordinance amending the municipal code of the respondent which "* 
2 
embodied the substance of the rejected negotiations proposal. Since its enact-
1_ The respondent' s proposal was as follows: 
"All employees covered by this Agreement, shall reside within a ten 
mile radius of the City of Auburn, but in no event shall they reside 
outside of Cayuga County, except Local Public Officers who must by 
statute reside in the City of Auburn. A Public Officer is defined 
as one who is appointed to discharge a public duty and receives a 
compensation for the same. Classifications presently considered 
Public Officers contained under this Agreement are as follows: 
Court Clerk and Stenographer, Registrar of Vital Statistics, employees 
designated as Deputy City Treasurer and Deputy City Clerk, Plumbing 
Inspector, Housing Code Inspector, Building Inspector, Sealer of 
Weights and Measures, Dog Warden. All new employees and all existing 
employees now residing within the City of Auburn, effective upon the 
date of this Agreement, will be required to reside within the City of 
Auburn. 
"A determination pursuant to the New York State Public Officers 
Law will be made when a new classification is added under this Agreement." 
2_ The ordinance provides: 
"Section 7-54. No new person shall be employed by the City unless 
at the commencement of his or her employment with the City said employee 
is a domiciliary of the City of Auburn. 
"In the event a City employee after commencing working for the City 
moves his domicile outside of the City of Auburn, his or her employment 
with the City of Auburn shall be terminated immediately upon said 
event occurring. 
"City employees who are legally residing outside of the City of 
Auburn at the time of adoption of this Ordinance shall not be required 
to move back into the City. 
"This Ordinance shall take effect immediately upon adoption."/BS^AC 
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ment, the Gity Manager has refused to negotiate over the residency requirement. 
It is this refusal to negotiate, in reliance upon the ordinance, and not its 
enactment, that now concerns us. 
Although the ordinance contains three provisions regarding residency, 
the charge relates only to one. The charging party does not complain about the 
requirement that no new"'person"""shallrfre^ employe'd- by the—respondent unless^ -at 
the commencement of such employment, the employee resides in the City of Auburn. 
Obviously, it does not complain of the provision that authorizes current city 
employees who were residing outside of the City of Auburn at the time of the 
enactment of the ordiance to continue to reside outside of the city. The 
charge is solely directed to the provision that a city employee would be fired 
if he should move from the city and, more particularly, to its impact upon 
persons employed by the respondent prior to the adoption of the ordinance. 
Thus, the narrow issue' before us is . whether ''& pub lie employer violates its duty 
tomegotiate in good faith when it unilaterally prohibits employees from moving 
out of the community upon penalty of discharge, where such employees were not 
hired subject to such a residency restriction. 
DISCUSSION 
The question herein is not before us for the first time. In Matter of 
Local #650, AFSCME and'City of Buffalo, 9-PERB 113015, we ruled that* while a 
decision whether or not to offer employment only to prospective employees who 
meet a residency requirement is a management prerogative, an employer may not 
unilaterally impose residency requirements upon persons who are already 
employed by it. In general, we confirm our holding in that case. However, the 
briefs call to our attention an interesting question that requires further con-
sideration. If a residency requirement is a qualification for initial employ-
ment, and we believe that it is, may an employee,".- \ deemed qualified for em-
4509 
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ployment prior to the residency requirement be disqualified by the subsequent 
imposition of a new qualification for his continued employment? We conclude 
3 that an employee who enjoys the protections of CSL §75 may not.— 
As a matter of law, tenured employees are exempt: from a residency 
requirement imposed subsequent to their hire. For such employees, a 
residency requirement is thus prohibited by law and the imposition of such a 
requirement upon them is not a mandatory subject of negotiation. It may be 
argued that, since individuals can waive their exemption from such a 
residency requirement, their employee-organization can waive it on their 
behalf in a collectively negotiated agreement in consideration for benefits 
received in that agreement (See Antinore v. State of New York, 49 App.Div. 2d 
6 [4th Dept., 1975], aff'd. NY'•_
 : [November 16, 1976]). Even if this 
were so, the imposition of a residency requirement upon already tenured 
employees is not a mandatory subject of negotiation because "[a]n employee 
organization cannot be compelled to negotiate over a demand that statutory 
rights of employees whom it represents be waived." (Matter of City of 
Binghamton, 9 PERB 1(3026 [1976], at p. 3045). Thus,while the respondent need 
not negotiate over a residency requirement for existing tenured employees, 
it may not impose such a requirement unless the employees' rights have 
been properly waived, 
_3. Accord: an opinion of the Commissioner of Education in Matter of Halloran, 
72 St. Dept, Rep. 17 (1951) overturning a requirement imposed by the New 
York City Board of Education that all members of its professional staff 
take a course qualifying them for the American Red Cross Standard First 
Aid Certificate;-. He reasoned that, 
"the taking and the completion of a course is a qualification 
for teaching and not a duty. The teacher's qualifications 
are set at the time of employment. That board of education, 
particularly after a teacher achieves tenure, may not add to 
these qualifications, dismissing a teacher for subsequent 
failure to meet them. The tenure law would be meaningless 
if this were so." & jjr-^ {,
 ;. 
4ttJ xXi 
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A residency requirement is generally a term and condition of employment. 
It may, however, be a continuing qualification for employment. An employee who 
is hired subject to a residency requirement continues to be subject to it as 
a qualification set at the time of his hire. But for the implications of CSL 
-§J3- and—tenure-, it would- be-a-mandatory- subject of- negotiation- for employees 
not hired subject to it. Therefore, the reasoning of our decision in Local #65C 
remains valid for employees^not hired subject to a residency requirement who do 
not enjoy the protections of CSL §75. The respondent violates its Taylor Law 
duty to negotiate in good faith when it unilaterally imposes a residency require-
ment upon them subsequent to the time of their employment. 
NOW, THEREFORE, in accordance with this above finding of fact and 
conclusions of law, and with regard to this specific violation of the Act that 
we have found, 
WE ORDER the City of Auburn to negotiate in good faith with the Auburn 
City Unit, Cayuga County Chapter, Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc. concerning a residency requirement for 
existing employees who are not subject to CSL §75; in all 
other::respects, the charge should be, and hereby is, dismissed 
DATED: Albany, New York 
December 21, 1976 
Robert D. Helsby, Chairman 
/ Joseph R. Crowley / 
Ida Klaus ' 
%«JJLJL 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TOWN OF ISLIP, 
- a n d -
LOCAL 237 , I . B . T . , 
- a n d -
#2E-12/21/76 
E m p l o y e r , 
Petitioner, Case No.C-1394 
C.S.E. A. ,INC., SUFFOLK COUNTY CHAPTER, 
' TOWN OF ISLIP UNIT, 
Intervenor. 
_CERTIFICATION_OF_REPRESENTATiy:E_AND_ORnER_TO__NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in accord-
ance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules, of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a .. 
negotiating representative has been selected; 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that LOCAL 237, I.B.T. 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees 
of the above named public employer, in the unit described below, 
as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: 
Excluded: 
All employees in the white collar unit 
included in the classifications set forth 
in attached Schedule "A". • 
Elected or appointed officials, department 
heads and deputies, designated confiden- •• 
tial employees, part-time, seasonal and 
temporary employees. 
Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with LOCAL 237, I.B.T. 
and enter into a written agreement with such employee organization 
with regard to terms and conditions of employment, and shall 
negotiate collectively with such employee organization in the 
determination of, and administration of, grievances. 
Signed on the 21st day of December 19 76. 
2r68) 
"ROBERT, D.' HELSBY'C CHAIRMAN 
JOSEPH k. CROWLEY ~^J 
IDA KLAUS 
4512 
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Engimeering Aide 
Engineering Inspector 
Principal Engineering Aide 
Sr. Draftsman 
Sr. Engineering Aide 
Building Inspector 
Building Plans Examiner 
Fire Prevention Inspector 
House Numbering Clerk 
Housing Inspector 
Plumbing Inspector 
Sr. Building Inspector 
Sr. Housing Inspector 
Sr. Zoning Inspector 
Zoning Inspector 
Community Relations Assistant 
Community Relations Specialist 
Neighborhood Aide 
Research Technician 
Environmentalist I 
Planner 
Sr. Planner 
Auditor 
Sr. Account Clerk 
D&A Community Coordinator 
Drug & Alcohol Counselor I 
Drug & Alcohol Counselor II 
Clerk-Spanish Speaking 
Labor Specialist I 
Cultural Affairs Supervisor 
' '' ' ' ' 1 
SCHEDULE A 
Whi t e C o l l a r t i t l e s i n t h e Town of I s l i p a r e as f o l l o w s : 
C l e r k 
Clerk-Typist 
Mail Clerk 
Sr. Clerk-Typist 
Stenographer 
Sr. Stenographer 
Principal Clerk 
Budget Analyst 
Assessment Aide 
_.. _._ Asseasment__As_sistanij! 
Sr. Assessment Assistant 
Law Assistant I 
Legal Stenographer 
Ordinance Inspector 
Sr. Zoning Inspector 
Account Clerk 
Administrative Aide 
Sanitation Inspector 
Switchboard Operator 
Micrographics Operator 
Computer Operator I 
Computer Programmer 
Key Punch Operator 
Sr. Computer Programmer 
Clerk-Handicapped 
Traffic Technician I 
Traffic Technician II 
Administrative Assistant 
D&A Program Co-ordinator 
Hotline Coordinator 
Principal Stenographer 
Public Relations Specialist 
Recreation Leader 
Assistant Rec. Center Manager 
Recreation Aide 
Recreation Specialist 
Assistant Recreation Leader 
Environmentalist II 
Environmentalist III 
Exec. Secretary to Bicentennial Committee 
Community Relations Assistant 
Senior Citizens Aide 
Sr. Citizens Program Supervisor 
Sr. Citizens Center Manager 
Environmental Analyst 
Engineer-in-Training 
Assistant Civil Engineer 
Draftsman 
